Shallcross and Giesecke: Historic Shipwreck Litigation

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LITIGATION
CONCERNING THE RECOVERY OF
HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS*
Douglas B. Shallcross** and Anne G. Giesecke***
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1950's, rapid advances in the technology of diving
and remote sensing equipment have for the first time made historic
shipwrecks accessible to many people. Three groups have a special
interest in historic shipwrecks: the sport diving community,
members of the archeological and historic preservation communities,
and professional treasure salvors. 1
The increasing demand on the historic shipwreck resource base
by these three groups has created a multiple-use conflict, much like
demands made on other finite resources in the environment. Each
group has a different use for the resource. For the sport diver, the
wrecks are an important focus for recreational diving. The diver
can see evidence of past sailors' lives and how they met their fates.
The goals of the treasure salvor and the archeologist conflict in that
the treasure salvor is primarily interested in what remains, while
the archeologist is primarily interested in what is missing. The
treasure salvor's goal is primarily economic; he wants to minimize
his cost while recovering gold, silver, or artifacts that have maximum commercial value. The archeologist's goal, on the other hand,
is to reconstruct past ways of life.
A historic shipwreck is a time capsule, a sealed self-sufficient
* This article is a substantially revised version of a paper entitled, The Status of
Federal and State Regulation of Underwater Cultural Res<mrces: Lessons of the Treasure Salvors
and Cobb Coin Cases, which was presented at the 14th Annual Conference on Underwater
Archaeology, Denver, Colorado, Jan. 1983.
** B.A., 1971, Heidelberg College (Ohio); M.A., 1976, University of Toledo; J.D., 1982,
University of Toledo. Currently a member of the Massachusetts Bar engaged in private
practice.
*** B.A., 1969, Boston University; MED, 1970, Boston University; MA, 1974, SUNY
Binghamton. Currently a Staff Consultant on Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
U.S. House of Representatives.
1. Treasure Hunting: There's Gold in Them Thar Galleons, NATION'S Bus. 61 (Aug.
1980). There are approximately two million sport divers in the United States, several thousand individuals who are members of the archaeological and historic preservation community
and about twenty professional treasure salvors.
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social unit from a past age. To the archeologist, the social, economic,
and technological systems of the past are reflected in the patterned
pieces of ship and cargo spread across the ocean floor. Reconstruction of the past requires the precise recording of the location of
each object, a study of the relationships among the objects, and
the reconstruction of objects found either as molds in the sand, or
as molds in mineral concretions. The recovery of this conceptual
information is as high a priority for the archeologist as the recovery
of gold and salable artifacts are for the treasure salvor. The quick
recovery techniques employed by the treasure salvor, however,
often destroy this conceptual information. 2
Not surprisingly, the competition among these groups has led
to efforts by governments, particularly state governments, 3 to
regulate the right to search for and recover historic shipwrecks.
This has in turn prompted the litigation which is the subject of this

2. ARCHAEOLOGY UNDERWATER 178-79 (K. Muckelroy ed. 1980).
3. Since 1963 twenty-five states have passed legislation to manage the historic shipwrecks in their waters for the public good. No state prohibits sport diving on historic shipwrecks and most laws provide in some way for recovery activities by private parties. The
following states have statutes. This list is taken from Giesecke, Shipwreck Archaeology and
the Law, Ph.D. dissertation, Washington, D.C., (1984).
Alaska - ALASKA STAT.§ 41.35 (1977)
Arizona - ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41.841 (1982)
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24.80.400 (1973)
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 267 (West 1982)
Georgia - GA. CODE ANN.§ 12.3 (1981)
Hawaii - HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 6E (1976)
Indiana - IND. CODE ANN.§ 14.3.3.3-4 (Burns 1981)
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41.1601(West1982)
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 373-378 (1982)
Massachusetts - MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 6, § 179-180 (West 1976)
Michigan - MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.§ 299.51-54 (West 1982)
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 138 (Callaghan 1979)
Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN.§ 39.7 (1972)
Montana - MONT. CODE ANN.§ 22.3 (1981)
New Hampshire - N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 227.C (1981)
New York - N.Y. NAv. LAW ANN.§ 14 (McKinney 1982)
North Carolina - N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 121.22-28 (1981)
North Dakota - N.D. CENT. CODE§ 55.02, .03 and .10 (1981)
Rhode Island - R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 42.45 (1977)
South Carolina - S.C. CODE ANN.§ 54.7.400 (Law. Co-op 1982)
Texas - TEX. CODE ANN.§ 191 (1978)
Vermont - VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 701 (1978)
Virginia - VA. CODE § 10.145 (1983)
Wisconsin - WIS. STAT.§ 27.012 (West 1973)
Northern Mariana Islands - Pub. L . No. 3-39, § 11.
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article. 4 Recently, the clash between one Florida-based salvage company, Treasure Salvors, Inc., 5 the State of Florida, and the United
States government substantially altered the status of state and
federal regulation of historic shipwreck resources. This article will
examine the current status of that regulation in light of this recent litigation.
Two sets of cases will be specifically examined. The first set
involves attempts by the United States Government and the State
of Florida to regulate control over the recovery, by private salvage
companies, of culturally significant shipwrecks that are discovered
on the Outer Continental Shelf. The second set concerns attempts
by state governments, in particular the State of Florida and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to regulate the recovery of such
wrecks within the so-called "three-mile limit."

II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS
The first series of cases resulted from the discovery of the
Spanish treasure galleon Nuestra Senora de Atocha. During the 17th
century, the Spanish empire organized a system of treasure fleets
to safeguard the transport of their riches from the colonies in the
Americas to the home ports of Spain. Normally, the fleets were
scheduled to depart the Caribbean prior to the start of the hurricane
season, June through October, but the fleet of 1622 was late in forming and did not set sail until September of that year. The Flagship
of the fleet, the Atocha, carried an immense treasure: 901 silver
bars, 161 gold bars or disks, and about 255,000 silver coins. In addition, it is generally assumed that the ship's titled passengers carried a substantial amount of contraband. As the fleet approached
the Florida Keys, a hurricane struck and three galleons went down
about nine miles offshore. The total value of the sunken cargo is
estimated today to be in excess of 250 million dollars. 6
In 1970, aided by a search of historical records in the Spanish
Archives in Seville, Treasure Salvors, Inc. began a search for the
Atocha and its sister ship the Santa Margarita. In June 1971, the
company made the first discovery of gold artifacts from what was
4. For a brief discussion of these same cases see Moyer, The Law of Historic Shipwrecks: Conflict and Controversy, PRESERVATION L. REP. (Nov. 1983).
5. Treasure Salvors, Inc. and its sister corporations, Armada Research Corporation
and Cobb Coin, Inc, were all formed by Melvin Fisher, a long-time Florida treasure hunter.
6. See generally Lyon, The Trouble With Treasure, 149 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 787 (1976)
and Lyon, Treasure from the Ghost Galleon, 161 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 228 (1982).

Published by SURFACE, 1983

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1983], Art. 7

374

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 10:371

believed to be the wreck of the Atocha at a site some nine miles
off the Florida Keys in waters which were then thought to be territorial waters of the State of Florida.7 As required by the Florida
Archives and History Act, Treasure Salvors entered into a series
of contracts with the State.8 These contracts granted the company
the exclusive right to search for and salvage the Atocha, and provided that seventy-five percent of the proceeds of any recovery
would be retained by the salvor, with the remaining twenty-five
percent being retained by the State of Florida.9 From 1971 to 1975,
Treasure Salvors recovered an estimated six million dollars in gold,
silver, and artifacts, and confirmed that the treasure recovered was
indeed from the Atocha. 10 During this period, the treasure recovered
was divided pursuant to the contract. 11
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in an unrelated case,
held that the State of Florida had no interest in, nor exercised any
control over, the waters or submerged lands containing the Atocha
wreck site. 12 Treasure Salvors subsequently repudiated its contract
with the State, and initiated an admiralty action in rem in the
Southern District of Florida to establish possession of, and confirmation of title to, the Atocha. 13 Treasure Salvors based its claim
on the theory that "where a vessel has been abandoned [at sea] the
finder in possession becomes the owner of the vessel" under general
principles of maritime law. 14 Thus, by undertaking to salvage the
Atocha, Treasure Salvors argued that it had effectuated possession
7. Lyon, The Trouble With Treasures, 149 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 787, 800 (1976); see also
Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340, 1343 (5th Cir. 1980).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 267.13 (1965). The Florida Archives and History Act claim ownership of all historic shipwrecks found in state waters. A salvor who wishes to search for historic
shipwrecks must obtain a license from the Florida Department of State, Division of Archives.
Upon discovery of a wreck the salvor must contract with the state for recovery of any
artifacts.
9. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 267 (1965).
10. Lyon, supra note 6, at 809.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
13. Actions for a salvage award in the case of property abandoned at sea are brought
in rem; that is, jurisdiction is had on the property salved since there is no owner who has
interest in the property and who would be subject to in personam jurisdiction. Such an action
gives rives to a maritime lien on property salved; thus the property may be executed on
in order to satisfy a judgment. G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY§ 8-13 (2d
ed. 1975).
14. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
408 F. Supp. 907, 909 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
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of the wreck and was therefore entitled to ownership and salvage
rights. 15
At the request of the State of Florida, the United States
Government intervened in the action and claimed title to the wreck
on the theory that "objects of antiquity recovered by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are taken in the name
of the sovereign and are the property of the people of this country
as a whole, not the finders alone." 16 This is the English common
law rule of "sovereign prerogative," with regard to property lost
or abandoned at sea. 17 The rule provides that in the absence of a
claim by the original owner, property which has been found to be
derelict at sea is acquired on behalf of the sovereign. 18 The Federal
Government maintained that the theory of sovereign prerogative
was legislatively asserted by the Congress through either the Abandoned Property Act, 19 or, alternatively, the Antiquities Act20 through
the operation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 21
The Abandoned Property Act provides, in part, that:
The Administrator of the General Services Administration is
authorized to make such contracts and provisions as he may deem
for the interest of the Government, for the preservation, sale nr
collection of any property, or the proceeds thereof, which may have
been wrecked, abandoned or become derelict, being within the
jurisdiction of the United States and which ought to come to the
United States ....22

Since the OCSLA purports to extend the jurisdiction of the United
States to include the area occupied by the wreck, the Federal
Government argued that the wreck and the artifacts recovered from
it belong to the United States. 23
Alternatively, the Federal Government argued that the Antiquities Act applies to all objects of antiquity found on federal lands. 24
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For a detailed discussion of the theory of sovereign prerogative and its origins,
see Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARYL. REV. 383
(1967).
18. The Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798).
19. 40 u.s.c. § 310 (1976).
20. 16 u.s.c. § 431 (1976).
21. 43 u.s.c. § 1331 (1976).
22. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1976) (emphasis added).
23. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
24. 16 u.s.c. §§ 431 & 432 (1976).
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It prohibits the removal of such objects without the permission of
the Secretary of the Interior. 25 Again relying on OCSLA, the Federal
Government contended that the artifacts removed from the wreck
site of the Atocha were from lands owned and controlled by the
United States, and therefore the theory of sovereign prerogative
should attach. 26
The trial court rejected both these claims. While the theory
of sovereign prerogative is recognized by American courts, the trial
court held that it must be explicitly asserted in legislation. 27 The
court concluded that neither the Abandoned Property Act, nor the
Antiquities Act provided the basis for such an assertion. 28 As for
the Abandoned Property Act, the court held that it applied only
to property which was abandoned as a consequence of the Civil War,
and therefore could not be used as a means to assert sovereign
prerogative in this . case. 29
In analyzing the Government's claim that the Antiquities Act
applies to the wreck site of the Atocha, the court noted that for
the Act to apply, the wreck must be on lands owned and controlled
by the United States. 30 As noted earlier, the Federal Government
claimed that the site in question was located on lands within the
jurisdiction and control of the United States by operation of
OCSLA. 31 The court rejected this argument, finding that OCSLA
25. Id.
26. 408 F. Supp. at 909.
27. Id. Generally, American courts have held that, absent a claim by the original owner,
title to property which has been shown to be lost or abandoned shall rest in the finder rather
than the sovereign. Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 17. Property has been abandoned when
its possession has been forsaken by its owner, or when all reasonable hope of recovery has
ceased. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 509 (1861). While American courts have acknowledged
the English rule, they have also held that colonial policy had altered the English common
law rules as to the ownership of abandoned property. United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820,
823 (1st Cir. 1902).
While it is difficult to trace its origins, the English rule of sovereign prerogative provides that in the absence of a claim by the original owner, property lost at sea belongs to
the sovereign rather than the finder. See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 17, at 383-85.
28. 408 F. Supp. at 909-10.
29. Id. at 909. The court relied on Russel v. Forty Bales Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42 (S.D.
Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154) which held the doctrine of sovereign prerogative must be legislatively
asserted. Absent an assertion of such prerogative the burden of abandoned property requires title. The Russel court held that the Abandoned Property Act, first passed in 1870,
applies only to the abandoned and derelict property strewn around the country as a result
of the Civil War. Since the property in Russel was not a product of that conflict, the Government could not rely on that Act to assert sovereign prerogative.
30. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
31. Id. at 910. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) reads in full:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States-
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was enacted primarily for the purpose of asserting ownership of,
and jurisdiction over, mineral resources. 32 Further, the court pointed
to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf which provides that coastal states may exercise sovereign rights over the
Continental Shelf only for exploring and exploiting its natural
resources. 34 Finally, the court quoted the report of the International
Law Commission on the Convention on the Continental Shelf which
stated that "[I]t is clearly understood that the rights in question
do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the
subsoil." 35
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter;
(2) this subchapter shall be construed in such a manner that the character of the
waters about the outer Continental Shelf as high seas and the right to navigation
and fishing therein shall not be affected;
(3) the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the
Federal Government for the public, which should be made available for expeditious
and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which
is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs;
(4) since exploration, development, and production of the minerals of the outer Continental Shelf will have significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of the
coastal States, and on other affected States, and, in recognition of the national interest in the effective management of the marine, coastal, and human
environments (A) such States and their affected local governments may require assistance
in protecting their coastal zones and other affected areas from any temporary or
permanent adverse effects of such impacts; and
(B) such States, and through such States, affected local governments, are entitled to an opportunity to participate, to the extent consistent with the national
interest, in the policy and planning decisions made by the Federal Government
relating to exploration for, and development and production of, minerals of the
outer Continental Shelf;
(5) the rights and responsibilities of all States and, where appropriate, local governments, to preserve and protect their marine, human, and coastal environments
though such means as regulation of land, air, and water uses, of safety, and of related
development and activity should be considered and recognized; and (6) operations
in the outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a safe manner by well-trained
personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient to prevent or
minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, spillages, physical
obstruction to other users of the waters or subsoil and seabed, or other occurrences
which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or
health.
32. 408 F . Supp. at 910, citing Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 457 (1962).
33. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L 55, done April
29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, in force June 10, 1964.
34. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
35. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
(1)
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Since the United States adopted the Continental Shelf Convention after the passage of OCSLA, the Convention supersedes
any incompatible language in OCSLA.36 Thus, the court concluded
that the Government had no basis for asserting sovereign
prerogative based on the Antiquities Act through the operation of
OCSLA.37 Accordingly, since the shipwreck in question was outside
the territorial waters of the United States, and since Congress had
not specifically asserted sovereign prerogative, the court concluded
that Treasure Salvors was entitled to claim ownership to the wreck
under the law of finds. 38
A. TREASURE SAL VORS ] 39

On appeal, the Federal Government reasserted its claim that
the Abandoned Property Act and the Antiquities Act represented
an assertion of sovereign prerogative, and also claimed that it need
not specifically assert the doctrine legislatively because it was the
successor to the prerogative rights of the English crown. 40 The
Federal Government also argued that marine peril, 41 a necessary
element in a salvage action, was missing and that the district court
had erred in applying salvage law. 42
The appellate court began its analysis with an extensive discussion of the jurisdictional basis of the Treasure Salvors action,
something the district court apparently assumed. 43 In addition to
the substantive arguments noted above, the Federal Government
also contended that the district court lacked in rem jurisdiction over
that part of the wreck that was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The appellate court acknowledged that in rem
admiralty actions normally require the presence of the vessel or
other res within the "territorial confines of the court." 44 One of the
purposes for this requirement is to allow actions to be brought
36. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 21 (5th Cir. 1970). "To the extent that any of
the terms of the [OCSLA] Act are inconsistent with the latest adopted Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf they should be considered superseded."
37. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
38. Id. at 911.
39. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) (Treasure Salvors !).
40. Id. at 340.
41. Marine Peril is a requirement for a salvage action. While the doctrine is usually
applied on a case by case basis, "peril" is generally considered to be a situation that requires some action to remove a vessel or its cargo from the danger of being damaged, lost
or destroyed. See 3 A. BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY§ 63 (7th ed. 1980).
42. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F .2d at 336.
43. Id. at 333.
44. Id.
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against a vessel when its owner cannot be reached.45 When the situation is such, however, that employing the legal fiction of suing the
res does not serve to effectuate the adjudication of such disputes,
then admiralty courts have shown no hesitation in declining to
employ it. 46 As a practical matter, the court recognized the impossibility of bringing the entire wreck within its territorial jurisdiction. As the court noted, there was little danger that the wreck,
which was buried under tons of sand in international waters, would
be lost. 47
The Fifth Circuit then concluded that the district court had
in personam jurisdiction over both claimants. 48 "The United States
intervened in plaintiffs' in rem action as a party defendant" and
stipulated to the court's admiralty jurisdiction.49 By so doing, the
United States had waived the usual requirement that the wreck
be present within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 50 Further,
the court noted that the parties had consented to the court's jurisdiction to decide the competing claims over the extraterritorial portion of the wreck. 51
Turning to the merits of the Government's claim, the court
found that there was no question that the Atocha was abandoned
and that in prior cases of this type, American courts applied the
law of finds whereby title to abandoned property at sea vests in
the person who reduces it to his or her possession. 52 Such a result,
according to the court, is not inconsistent with salvage law. 53
In considering the application of the Antiquities Act and the
extension of U.S. territorial jurisdiction through OCSLA, the court
adopted the district court's view that the wreck of the Atocha did
not lie on lands owned and controlled by the United States. 54 The
court considered in detail the history of OCSLA, its companion piece
of legislation, the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 55 and the relationship of OCSLA to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Outer Con-

45. Id. at 334. See also Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S.19, 22-23 (1960).
46. 569 F.2d at 334, and case cited therein.
47. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 335.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Alternatively, the court declared that it had an independent basis for jurisdiction derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1337 to decide the applicability of the Abandoned Property
Act and the Antiquities Act to that portion of the vessel found in international waters.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 336-37.
53. Id. at 337.
54. Id. at 340.
55. 43 u.s.c. § 1301 (1976).
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tinental Shelf. The court found that both the SLA and OCSLA were
intended to resolve competing claims over the exploitation of natural
resources between the states and the Federal Government. 56 Relying
on United States v. Maine, 57 the court concluded that Congress had
established, through OCSLA, that the United States' rights were
paramount to the states' interests in submerged lands beyond the
three-mile limit. 58 While the purpose of OCSLA might have been
to extend the jurisdiction and control of the United States to the
Outer Continental Shelf, the court noted that the legislative history
of the Act, as an amendment to the Submerged Lands Act, indicated
that its purpose was to establish boundaries, between the Federal
Government and the states, for the exploration and exploitation
of natural resources. 59 The court also noted that OCSLA itself was
almost exclusively concerned with measures designed to facilitate
the development of underwater natural resources. 60
Like the trial court, the appellate court found the subsequent
ratification by the United States of the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf persuasive. "[A]n extension of jurisdiction for purposes of controlling the exploitation of the natural resources of the
continental shelf is not necessarily an extension of sovereignty ." 61
The court went on to cite, as did the lower court, the International
Law Commission's comments on article 2 of the Convention which
noted that the Convention intended that rights granted to coastal
states did not extend to shipwrecks and their cargoes. 62 The court
concluded that in view of the limited control of the United States
over the wreck site of the Atocha, the Atocha did not lie on lands
owned or controlled by the United States, and thus the Antiquities
Act could not apply to its recovery. 63
56. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 338.
57. 420 U.S. 515, 526 (1975).
58. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 338. See also Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962).
59. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 339. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301,
granted the states jurisdiction over submerged lands within three miles of their territorial
boundaries. Its purpose was to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), which held that the United States held superior rights to the
offshore seabed, including that portion within the so-called three-mile limit. See Treasure
Salvors I, 569 F .2d at 338.
60. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 339.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 340 (citing 11 U.S. [sic] GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)).
See supra notes 34, 35 and accompanying text.
63. Id.
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In considering the Government's claims under the Abandoned
Property Act, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that it was not a legislative assertion of sovereign
prerogative. 64 The appellate court, however, modified the district
court's reasoning as to the application of the Act. Rather than rejecting the Act as applying only to abandoned Civil War property,
the court reasoned that it applied only to property to which the
United States had an equitable claim.65 Because, in the court's words,
"the United States has no claim of equitable ownership in a Spanish
vessel wrecked more than a century before the American Revolution, and the wreck is not 'within the jurisdiction of the United
States' the Abandoned Property Act has no application to the present controversy ." 66
Finally, the court examined the Government's argument that
it need not assert sovereign prerogative legislatively because it was
the successor in interest to the English crown's right of sovereign
prerogative, and concluded that the United States could not assert
such a claim. The court held that "the notion of sovereign
prerogative never took root in America." 67 The court found that
while at least one Florida court has followed the English rule of
sovereign prerogative, 68 the "American rule" of vesting title in the
finder in possession is clearly favored. 69 In summary, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Treasure Salvors
was entitled to possession of all treasures and artifacts recovered
from the Atocha and remanded the case to the district court for
further action.
B.

TREASURE SAL VORS Il70

Upon remand, Treasure Salvors moved the district court to
issue an ancillary warrant to compel the State of Florida to release
64. Id. at 342.
65. Id. at 341-42. See United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902).
66. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F .2d at 342.
67. Id. at 342. The court based its conclusion on United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820
(1st Cir. 1902), which overturned an earlier case, Peabody v. Proceeds of Twenty-eight Bags
of Cotton, 19 F. Cas. 39 (D. Mass. 1829) (No. 10869) which had supported the assertion of
sovereign prerogative.
68. 569 F.2d at 343 (citing Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1956)~ cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957)). See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 17, at 397-98.
69. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F .2d at 343.
70. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621F.2d1340
(5th Cir. 1980).
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to the court that portion of the treasure which was in its possession as a result of prior contracts between Treasure Salvors and
the State. Florida refused, alleging that it owned the artifacts in
question by operation of its contracts with Treasure Salvors and
that the district court's attempt to adjudicate its claim amounted
to a suit against the State and was therefore barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 71 Further, the State argued that it had specifically
asserted the theory of sovereign prerogative legislatively through
the passage of section 267.061 of the Florida Archives and History
Act 12 which provides, in part, that:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to protect
and preserve historic sites and properties ... sunken or abandoned
ships, ... or any part thereof, relating to the history, government
and culture of the state. It is further declared to be the public
policy of the state that all treasure trove, artifacts and such objects having intrinsic or historical and archaeological value which
have been abandoned on state-owned lands or state-owned
sovereignty [sic] submerged lands shall belong to the state with
the title thereto vested in the division of archives, history, and
records management of the department of state for the purpose
of administration and protection. 73

The district court quickly disposed of the Eleventh Amendment
claim by noting that the Eleventh Amendment "is not a sword
whereby the agents of the state can take and appropriate the property and the lives of its citizens without due process." 7'
Treasure Salvors argued that Florida was in privity with the
United States in regard to the prior litigation and was bound by
the court's decision. 75 Florida claimed that it was not bound by the
prior litigation because it was not in privity with either of the

71. 629 F.2d at 511. The Eleventh Amendment provides in relevant part: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State
...." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
72. Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
459 F. Supp. 507, 522 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
73. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 267.061(West1976). The statute has been amended by the insertion of a comma after "artifacts" and by the capitalization of "Division of Archives, History,
and Records Management of the Department of State." FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 267.061 (West
Supp. 1983).
74. Id. at 528.
75. The court in Treasure Salvors I held that the prior adjudication of the claim between Treasure Salvors and the United States extended only to parties or their privies
and not to other claimants, if there by any. 569 F .2d at 335-36.
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parties in the previous action and, therefore, it lacked mutuality
of interest with the United States. Thus, Florida was free to adjudicate its claim independent of the prior litigation. 76 The court
summarily rejected that argument, holding that the State of Florida,
through its Division of Archives, knew and participated in the prior
litigation and was fully aware that the proceedings were in rem,
were brought to settle the ownership of the treasure against the
entire world. 77 The State was thus in privity with the United States
in relation to the previous action and was bound by the court's prior
decision. 78
The court then went on to consider the question of the State's
claim that its "salvage contract" with Treasure Salvors vested it
with a contract right to the treasure. The court found that both
parties to the contract had mistakenly thought that the State of
Florida exercised sovereignty over the wreck site of the Atocha. 79
Because this was not the case, the doctrine of mutual mistake
operated to void the contract. 80 Additionally, the court found that
the contract failed for lack of consideration, since in return for a
$1,200 permit fee, Treasure Salvors was granted salvage rights to
a wreck site in waters in which the State of Florida had no interest.81
Finally, the court dealt with the State's assertion of sovereign
prerogative. Florida argued that section 267 .061 of the Archives
and History Act operated as a legislative determination of sovereign
prerogative. The court held that a state cannot constitutionally alter
general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, nor congressional acts
concerning admiralty and maritime law. 82 To allow Florida to assert
sovereign prerogative would conflict with the judicial power of
United States courts to exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.83
The court also found that section 267 .061 was unconstitutionally
vague based on the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Diaz. 84

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

459 F. Supp. at 512-13.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 524.
83. Id. at 525.
84. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1974). But see United States v.
Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 941 (10th Cir. 1979), which held that the Antiquities Act was not unconstitutionally vague and expressly refused to follow Diaz.
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Diaz declared that a section of the Antiquities Act, 85 which attempted to define certain types of ancient artifacts, was void for
vagueness. 86 The Treasure Salvors court found that the Florida
statute was substantially the same as the federal statute in Diaz,
because many of the terms used to describe the class of items to
which Florida claimed ownership, such as "artifacts," "objects of
antiquity," and "monuments and memorials" were not defined. 87 Additionally, the one term the Florida statute did define, "treasure
trove," the court found confusing and at variance with the common
law meaning of the term. In the statute, treasure trove is defined
as gold, silver, bullion, jewelry, pottery, ceramics, antique tools and
fittings, ancient weapons, etc. 88 The meaning of treasure trove in
the common law refers, according to the court, to treasure trove
which is concealed by the owner and does "not include articles of
salvage." 89
Florida appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the
district court's opinion on all but the privity issue, which it refused to affirm or reverse. 90 The appellate court dealt in some detail
with the Eleventh Amendment issue which the district court had
decided in summary fashion. The Fifth Circuit concluded that while
the Eleventh Amendment does apply to in rem actions in admiral-·
ty, it does so only in a case where there is an uncontroverted claim
of ownership by the state.91 In the case of a controverted claim, the
merits of the plaintiff's claim are inextricably bound together and
the court must determine the merits of the claim in order to decide
the question of jurisdiction.92 The court decided that the company's
claim to the Atocha was determinative of both the jurisdictional
question and the merits. 93 Since Florida lacked any ownership interest in the artifacts recovered, or for that matter, the wreck site
itself, Treasure Salvors' in rem admiralty action was not a suit
against a state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 94
85. 16 u.s.c. § 433 (1976).
86. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 1974).
87. 459 F. Supp. 507, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621F.2d1340 (5th Cir. 1980)
[Treasure Salvors II].
91. Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1346.
94. Id.
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Florida subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted review solely on the narrow issue of whether the
Eleventh Amendment barred an in rem admiralty action which
seeks to recover property held by state officials under a claim that
the property belonged to the state.95
C.

TREASURE SAL VORS II IN THE SUPREME COURT 96

In considering Florida's claim, a plurality of the Court 97 held
that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar an action against a
state official that is based on a theory that the officer acted beyond
the scope of his statutory authority, or if within that authority, that
such authority is unconstitutional." 98 The relief granted in such cases
is limited to "permissible prospective relief." 99 "Permissible prospective relief' is relief which does not require retroactive payment from
the state's treasury. 100 Retrospective relief, on the other hand, does
require the payment of funds from the state's treasury. 101
The plurality opinion applied a three-part test to determine
whether the Eleventh Amendment should apply in this case:
(a) Is this action asserted against officials of the State or is it an
action brought against Florida itself? (b) Does the challenged conduct of state officials constitute an ultra vires or unconstitutional
withholding of property or merely a tortious interference with
property rights? (c) Is the relief sought by Treasure Salvors permissible prospective relief or is it analogous to a retroactive award
that requires uthe payment of funds from the state treasury?" 102

In applying this test, the Court found that Treasure Salvors' action
was not directed against the State, but rather at certain State
95. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682 (1982).
96. Id.
97. The plurality opinion was by Justice Stevens in which the Chief Justice and Justices
Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan concurred in the result, but held that the
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in this case because Treasure Salvors is a Florida corporation, thus the suit was not "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another State." 458 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 689.
99. Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1979)). Permissible prospective
relief is relief which does not require retroactive payment from the state treasury. In Quern
the court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from requiring a state
to pay back welfare payments which had been illegally withheld from welfare recipients.
The court, however, did require the state to send a notice to welfare recipients informing
them of a state administrative procedure which then lead to recovery of back benefits.
100. 458 U.S. at 690.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 691.
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officials. 103 Treasure Salvors' original complaint was in the form of
an in rem action which sought title to an abandoned sailing vessel,
and was not against the State of Florida. 104 Further, the warrant
for the arrest of the artifacts was directed at certain named State
officials, not at the State itself.
In considering the second question, the Court held that the
State did not have a "colorable claim of title" to the artifacts in
question. 105 The salvage contracts upon which the State relied as
the basis for its claim did not, according to the Court, purport to
grant title or ownership of any other artifacts to the State. 106 In
fact, neither party's ownership rights were in any way affected by
the existence of the contracts. 101 Rather, Florida's claim of ownership was based solely upon the Archives and History Act which,
as noted earlier, purported to assert State ownership of all
historically significant shipwrecks discovered in State waters. 108
Because the Court had previously ruled in United States v. Florida 109
that the submerged lands upon which the artifacts were found were
not owned by the State, the Court concluded that the Florida statute
did not provide a basis for asserting a claim that the artifacts at
issue belong to the State. 110
Finally, the Court considered the question of the relief granted
by the Fifth Circuit which allowed the execution of the district
court's ancillary warrant, and which subsequently awarded the artifacts to Treasure Salvors. The Court concluded that such relief
was not an action that resulted in "attachment of state funds and
[thus] would impose no burden on the state treasury." 111 Accordingly,
the Court sustained the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it held
that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the district court from
issuing a warrant to secure the possession of the Atocha artifacts
which were then in possession of named Florida officials. 112 Nevertheless, to the extent that the appellate court adjudicated the State's
rights to the artifacts as part of its Eleventh Amendment analysis,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
420 U.S. 531 (1975).
458 U.S. at 695.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 699.
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a clear majority of the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
decision. 113
Apparently the trial court should have limited its analysis to
whether the State had a "colorable claim of title" to the wreck. If
the State can establish a colorable claim, Treasure Salvors' suit is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court apparently rejected
the appellate court's theory that the jurisdictional issue was intrinsically tied to a determination on the merits of the State's Eleventh
Amendment claim. Exactly how the appellate court is supposed to
separate the question of a "colorable claim of title" from a determination on the merits is not discussed in the plurality's opinion. 114
Upon remand, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
original order insofar as it transferred possession of the artifacts
to Treasure Salvors. 115 The court noted that the Supreme Court's
plurality opinion found that the district court's warrant "merely
secured possession of the property and its execution did not finally
adjudicate the State's rights to the artifacts." 116 The appellate court
ordered the district court to enter a final order declaring "Treasure
Salvors to be the owner of the artifacts as against all claimants except the State of Florida." 111 The court emphasized that its decision in this matter did "not determine in any way whether the State
of Florida was the owner of the artifacts." 118
While, as a practical matter, Florida lost its claim to the artifacts at issue, this case does not establish a rule that if a state
can demonstrate a "colorable claim of title" to a historic shipwreck
(i.e., one found within its territorial waters and to which it claims
title), it can assert that a salvor's in rem action to establish title
to a wreck is in fact a suit against the state and thus barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. Title to a particular wreck would then
be litigated in the courts of that state.
113. Id. Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred with the plurality
opinion to the extent that it held that the lower court's adjudication of the state's claim
of title to the artifacts was improper. Justice Brennan was the sole dissenter. Id. at 705.
114. Justice White, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that
the suit was against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and thus
barred. The plurality opinion, according to the dissenters, was based upon "the fantasy that
the enforcement of process by arrest of the res [artifacts] is somehow divorced from the
action to determine the state's claim to the res ...." Id. at 705.
115. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, 689 F.2d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir.
1982).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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This approach has been successfully used by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel. 119 The facts
in this Massachusetts case are strikingly similar to the facts in Cobb
Coin, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel. 120
A private salvage company discovered what it believed to be the
wreck of the British pirate ship Windah, which reportedly sank onequarter mile off the coast of Massachusetts in April, 1717. The
Federal admiralty court in Massachusetts held that the private
salvor was precluded from bringing an in rem action for title to
a historic shipwreck whose title was claimed by the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. 121 The court reasoned that as long as a state can
present a "colorable claim of title" to the wreck, the Eleventh
Amendment precludes the Federal court from adjudicating the
state's claim to the wreck. 122 In Maritime Surveys, the Federal court
found that Massachusetts had in fact presented a "colorable claim
of title" to the wreck through the operation of a statute very similar
to both the Florida Archives and History Act, and the Submerged
Lands Act. 123 Therefore, in light of the Federal court's lack of
jurisdiction over the claim, the salvor's suit was dismissed. 124
On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal
on different grounds. 125 The appellate court did not reach the issue
of colorability of title, although it noted parenthetically that it did
not doubt that the State's claim was "at least" colorable. 126 Rather,
the court held that because Maritime's complaint was framed in
terms of an action against any "state" which claimed an interest
in the wreck, the suit was in fact an action against the state and
was thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 127
D. TREASURE SAL VORS I!I 128
Prior to the Supreme Court's review of Treasure Salvors II,
119. No. 82-3553, slip op. at (D. Mass. Jan. 14, 1983). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1982,
at 38, col. 1.
120. 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981). See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 180 and ch. 91, § 63 (West 1976).
124. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, No. 82-3553, slip op. at (D. Mass. Jan. 14, 1983).
125. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 717 F .2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 6, 8.
128. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the Fifth Circuit decided Treasure Salvors III, which had set the
stage for the Cobb Coin, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel1 29 decision which is discussed below. Treasure
Salvors III also reaffirms the application of both salvage law and
the law of finds, to property abandoned at sea, including property
from historically significant shipwrecks. Most importantly, this decision supports the principle whereby the finder of a historic shipwreck may legitimize his or her find by filing an in rem action in
Federal admiralty court.
The Treasure Salvors III controversy began when a rival salvor
attempted to conduct salvage operations within the area described
and claimed by Treasure Salvors as the wreck site of the Atocha. 130
At the request of Treasure Salvors, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction against any interference with the company's
recovery operations. The rival salvor appealed,1 31 and the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's injunction, although it modified
the period for which the injunction would be effective. 132 The appellate court also reaffirmed its holdings in the previous Treasure
Salvors cases: namely, that international maritime law gave the
United States admiralty courts jurisdiction over salvage operations
on the high seas, regardless of the nationality of the vessels or the
parties conducting the salvage operations. 133 The court noted that
the salvor had a vested interest in the salvage operation because
he is compensated only by what he recovers. 134 Admiralty law protects the exclusivity of his operation as long as he "appears ready,
willing and able to complete the salvage project," and as long as
he brings the proper in rem action before an admiralty court. 135
The court further affirmed that the law of finds applies in circumstances similar to those of Treasure Salvors III, particularly
given the extraordinary fact that the Atocha's cargo had been lost
for over 300 years. 136 Treasure Salvors, according to the court, had
a maritime lien on the wreck site itself, as well as on any property
recovered, and had a possessory interest in any of the cargo which
it acquired. 137 Thus, the court concluded that Treasure Salvors was
129. Cobb Coin, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F.
Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981), and 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982); See supra note 139.
130. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
640 F.2d 560, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1981) [Treasure Salvors III].
131. Id. at 564.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 567.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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entitled to protection in the form of an injunction prohibiting any
interference with its salvage operations. 138

III. THE COBB COIN CASE AND STATE REGULATION OF
HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS139
A. THE BACKGROUND

In 1978, Treasure Salvors' president and principal stockholder,
Melvin Fisher, formed a new corporation, Cobb Coin, Inc., for the
purpose of exploring a section of ocean thought to contain the wreck
of a Spanish treasure galleon from the Plate Fleet which reportedly
sank off the Florida coast in 1715. 140 The site in question was within
the three-mile limit over which the State of Florida asserted
sovereignty and, consequently, the Florida Archives and History
Act 141 became applicable in reference to the salvage of underwater
aritiquities. 142 Not long after commencing salvage operations, Cobb
Coin found a number of artifacts thought to be from the galleon.
Accordingly, the company filed an in rem action in Federal
admiralty court asking that it be declared the owner in possession
of the wrecked vessel, or alternatively that it be awarded compensation for salvage services performed on the vessel. 143
The State of Florida intervened and counterclaimed. Florida
asked the court to declare it the owner of the vessel and to a ward
it restitution from Cobb Coin for all items that the latter had
salvaged from the wreck. 1" The State further asserted that because
it was the owner of the wreck by virtue of the Florida Archives
and History Act 145, it had plenary authority to regulate the salvage
of the vessel. 146 The State also attempted to enforce its claim in the
Florida courts by initiating criminal action against Cobb Coin, its
president, and its employees. 147
In response, Cobb Coin asked for and received a temporary
138. Id. at 573.
139. Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp.
186 (S.D. Fla.1981) (Motion for preliminary injunction); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Final Judgment); [Though
there is but one case, the two parts have been denominated as Cobb Coin I & II, respectively, for ease of reference].
140. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. 186.
141. FLA. STAT. 4NN. ch. 207 (1975). See sU'pra text accompanying note 72.
142. 525 F. Supp. at 194.
143. Id. at 190.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 191.
147. Id.
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restraining order from the Federal court enjoining the State and
its employees from "interfering with the plaintiffs ongoing salvage
operations by carrying out their threatened arrests." 148 Both parties subsequently made motions for temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions. 149 After a hearing on the motions, the
court issued an extensive opinion that, in part, granted Cobb Coin's
request for a preliminary injunction to prevent both the State of
Florida, and a rival salvor from interfering with its salvage opera-·
tion at the contested site. 150 In a subsequent proceeding, the court
made permanent its preliminary injunction, and reaffirmed its conclusion that Cobb Coin was entitled to exclusive salvage rights of
~he wreck. 151 The court's opinion gives a clear indication that where
a state regulation of historic shipwreck resources conflicts with
federal principles of admiralty and maritime law, the state statute
will be struck down as unconstitutional.
B. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
At the outset of its opinion, the court reviewed in detail the
basis for its jurisdiction.152 Consideration of the jurisdictional issues
is important, for the court's opinion on this matter forms the basis
by which salvors may use federal admiralty courts to legitimize their
claims to historic wrecks found in state waters. The Court considered whether it possessed in rem jurisdiction "as to that portion of the wreck which had not been recovered and whether the
court's in personam jurisdiction was properly asserted over the
State." 153 The court also considered whether the suit was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 154
The court first held that its jurisdiction "is properly founded
on traditional maritime, in rem, and in personam principles." 155
Florida apparently argued that the case was not properly before
the court because the vessel in question no longer remained intact. 156
The court rejected this argument, noting that the court's in rem
jurisdiction extends to the wreck site and to identifiable cargo, and
pot merely to the salvagable material contained within an intact

148. Id. at 192.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 220.
151. Cobb Coin II, 549 F. Supp. at 563.
152. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 194-99.
153. Id. at 194-95. The court's in rem jurisdiction as to those artifacts recovered and
turned over to the court's interim order was not in dispute.
154. Id. at 196.
155. Id. at 194.
156. Id. at 194-95.
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hull. 157 The court also found that jurisdiction "is predicated on in
personam, rather than in rem principles" in a case where two parties are claiming rights to salvage a vessel. 158 This observation is
based upon the notion that the dispute centers on the parties' claim
to the same wreck and is not an action in rem seeking "to recover
against the vessel for salvage in which the in rem fiction is used
to personify the vessel." 159 The court then went on to describe a
process by which a salvor who finds archaeologically or historically significant shipwrecks may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
admiralty courts to establish a claim for a salvage award:
[O]nce a salvor who discovers and brings up an artifact from an
identifiable wreck site initiates suit by taking that object into
federal court .... The filing of such suit is, as here, an open invitation ... for claimants and competing salvors to come before the
court and make their alleged interests known. 160

The court also found that Cobb Coin's suit was not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, as Florida had contended. 161 Subsequent
to the court's entry of its order which partially granted Cobb Coin's
motion for a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court decided
Treasure Salvors II. 162 Consequently, in its final order, the court dealt
extensively with Florida's Eleventh Amendment claim. As noted
in the earlier discussion, the Supreme Court applied a three-part
test in deciding whether Treasure Salvors' claim was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. 163 In applying the test to Cobb Coin, the
district court concluded that this suit was not an action against a
state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 164 The court
found that the plaintiffs filed an in rem action in admiralty court
asking for a declaration that they were the owners in possession
of a lost or abandoned sailing vessel. 165 The plaintiffs did not state
a claim against the State of Florida, and determination of the State's
ownership was not necessary to determine the plaintiff's rights

157. Id. at 195.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 195-96, (quoting Treasure Salvors III, 640 F.2d at 567-68).
160. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 197.
161. Id.
162. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
163. Cobb Coin II, 549 F. Supp. at 550-51. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
The court indicated that because no state officials were named as parties, the second element of the test did not apply.
164. Id. at 551.
165. Id.
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under federal law. 166 Indeed, as the court noted, the wreck was not
in the possession of the State or any of its officers and there was,
according to a majority of the judges, a requirement that such
possession exist in order to determine ownership. 167
The third element of the Treasure Salvors test is that an action
against a state for "unconstitutional or ultra vires conduct ... is
permissible only if it seeks prospective relief and not relief
analogous to a retroactive award that requires 'the payment of funds
from the state treasury."' 168 Even though the State claimed all of
the sunken treasure through the Archives and History Act, it could
not "exercise that dominion which would supersede the plaintiffs"
rights. 169 Florida, therefore, could not assert superior rights over
"the plaintiff's federal salvage rights under the [federal] maritime
law." 110 Additionally, Cobb Coin would still be entitled to a salvage
a ward even if Florida did own the wreck in question. 171 Moreover,
the court reasoned that because of the unique nature of the wreck
site, the normal salvage award, usually a monetary award derived
from the sale of the recovered cargo, was not appropriate. 172 The
court concluded that where the items recovered are "uniquely and
intrinsically valuable beyond their monetary worth, an award in
specie is more appropriate." 173 Accordingly, since the plaintiff, Cobb
Coin, would receive a salvage award in artifacts, there would be,
the court reasoned, no money expended from the State's treasury
and therefore the plaintiff's action was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 174
The court also noted that the Eleventh Amendment cases relied

166. Id. at 552.
167. Id. at 551-52. The court also found that the instant case was not an action against
the state with reference to state law. While the Florida statutory scheme purports to vest
ownership of the wreck and its artifacts in the state, the court held the Florida statute ineffective in this respect. Id. at 553. Thus a suit for relief from state actions which are unconstitutional is not a suit against the state for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
State Road Dept. of Florida v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941), cited in Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 709 (1982) (White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
168. Cobb Coin JI, 579 F. Supp. at 554 (quoting Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 692 (1982)).
169. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 196.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. Cobb Coin JI, 549 F. Supp. at 554.
173. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 198.
174. Id.
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upon by Florida, involve circumstances in which "public property
[was] used and employed by the state for a public purpose." 175 Clearly, according to the court, property which had lain on the bottom
of the ocean for 260 years could not have been used for any governmental purpose. 176 Accordingly, the court found that the State's
Eleventh Amendment argument was not appropriate.
C.

THE MERITS

Concluding that jurisdiction was proper, the court then turned
to a lengthy discussion of the merits of Cobb Coin's claim. The court
began by examining the Florida Archives and History Act and its
attendant regulations in light of the principles of federal maritime
law. 177 It concluded that Florida's regulatory scheme conflicted with
the essential purposes of federal maritime law, and thus violated
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 178 According to the
court, the basic rule for resolving conflicts between state statutes
and federal maritime law is found in Sou{hern Pacific Co. v. Jensen: 179
[W]ell established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress or affect the general
maritime law beyond certain limits .... And plainly, we think, no
such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an Act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes
with the proper harmony and uniformity of the law in its international and interstate relations. 180

The court acknowledged that states may supplement the
remedies available to enforce federal rights, and to legislate over
matters implicitly and explicitly left to them by Congress; 181 but
it found that this case involved neither situation. 182 The court found
that there were a number of federal salvage rules with which the
Florida scheme conflicted, and because of the dominant federal interest in maritime matters, the Florida Statute and the rules promulgated under it must necessarily give way. 183 Specifically, the
175. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
176. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 198-99.
200.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 201; U.S. CONST. art. VI,§ 2.
179. 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
180. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 201 (citing Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
216 (1916)).
181. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 201.
182. Id.
183. Id.

at
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court found three major flaws in the Florida statutory scheme:
(1) The Florida statute forbidding exploration except to [state]
licensees violates potential salvors' rights to explore the ocean for
salvageable sites. 184
(2) Under the Florida licensing scheme, unmeritorious salvors
may be granted exclusive rights to salve in contravention of the
maritime law. 185
(3) Florida's system of fixed salvor compensation conflicts with
admiralty's flexible method of remuneration based on risk and
merit. 186

The Florida statute requires that any salvor who searches for
archaeological or historic shipwrecks must first obtain a license from
the State Division of Archives and History. 187 This allows the salvor
the exclusive right to search for and salvage any wreck found within
a "specified" area. The salvor is prohibited from searching outside
that area. The principles of salvage law on the other hand, allow
any salvor, without restriction, to explore all navigable waters, in
search of potential sites. 188 This right, according to the courts, is
a fundamental adjunct to the American principle of freedom of the
high seas. 189 Thus, the plaintiff, Cobb Coin, had a right to search
and salvage the site in question without interference from the State
of Florida. 190 Further, the court found that the licensing of the wreck
site in question to another salvor was immaterial,191 since that salvor
did not invoke the federal court's jurisdiction for an appropriate
salvage award. 192
The second defect the court found in the Florida statutory
scheme stems from the principle that salvage awards shall be made
on the basis of diligence and effort, and that undeserving salvors
shall not be granted awards. 193 As mentioned earlier, a salvor who
discovers a historic shipwreck may bring an in rem action to
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 207.
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 267 (West 1975) and FLA. ADMIN. CODE§ lA-31.01-.12.
Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 207.
The rival salvor, Quest Corp., was an intervenor in this case.
Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 203-04.
Id. at 204.
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establish his exclusive right to salvage the wreck. 194 In order for
a salvor to receive an exclusive right to salvage a wreck site, he
must, according to one commentator, "'manifest an intent to reduce
the property to physical possession by dealing with the wreck in
a manner which would tend to warn off ... [other] salvors."' 195 This
does not necessarily mean that the salvor must take and maintain
immediate physical possession of the wreck, but rather he must
undertake a continuing program of recovery .196 If, on the other hand,
the "first finder" abandons his claim, his rights to a wreck pass to
any salvor who diligently undertakes salvage operations. 197 In comparing the above principles with the State licensing program the
court noted that,
[l]t is readily apparent that, at least for the period of his lease with
the State, a salvor's diligence in conducting his operations is
irrelevant to his continued exclusive right to work a particular
wreck site. Contrary to federal salvage principles, after an initial
assessment of the salvors apparent abilities, the State's lessee is
permitted sole occupancy of wreck site regardless of his diligence. 198

The court seem particularly influenced by the fact that Florida
had granted a license for this site two years earlier to another
salvor. 199 In these two years, the salvor, Quest Corporation, had
worked the site for a total of forty-nine days with minimal success. 200
Cobb Coin, on the other hand, had managed to recover substantial
treasure after working the site only a few months.
The third area of conflict results from the fact that "Florida's
system of fixed salvor compensation conflicts with admiralty's flexible method of renumeration based on risk and merit." 202 Florida's
regulatory scheme requires that upon discovery of a historic or archaeologically significant wreck, the salvor enter into a contract
with the State which provides, among other things, for a predetermined percentage payment to the salvor for recovery of any

194. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 204 (citing Lawrence, State Antiquity Laws and Admiralty Salvage: Protecting our Cultural Resources, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 291, 295 (1978)).
196. Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 204.
197. Id. at 205.
198. Id. at 206.
199. Id. at 206-07.
200. Id. at 207.
201. See generally, Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 190-96.
202. Id. at 207.
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artifacts. 203 As a practical matter, the evidence before the courts
showed that most of the contracts provided for a 75-25 percent split
between the salvor and the State, respectively. 204 The court found
such an arrangement inconsistent with traditional salvage laws requiring that the salvor be liberally rewarded. 205 Under maritime
rules the salvor is usually paid his expenses plus a bonus depending on the cost and the merit of his services. 206 In addition, until
the salvage award is actually made, the salvor receives a lien against
the salvaged property. 207 In the case of abandoned property, such
as the items salvaged in the present case, the salvor may receive
an award equal to the entire amount of abandoned property
recovered. 208 The Florida statute, however, mandates that all artifacts recovered belong to the State of Florida. 209 This, according
to the court, directly conflicts with the admiralty principle that a
salvage award reflect the efforts of the salvor on an individual
basis. 210
The court noted that not only must the state statute conflict
with federal maritime principles, but the federal interest affected
must be substantial. 211 The court recognized that even when federal
interests were affected, they may be outweighed by a presumption
in favor of state statutes. 212 The court concluded, however, that in
this case the federal principle of uniformity, as applied to the principle of maritime law, was an important consideration when dealing with the salvage of historically important shipwrecks. 213 The
court was apparently fearful that a plethora of different state laws
would undermine federal uniformity in salvage law. 214 The court further noted that any state interest could be addressed by fashioning an appropriate remedy in admiralty. 215
The court also considered whether this was "peculiarly a matter

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

ADMIN. CODE§
Cobb Coin I, 525 F.
Id. at 203, 207.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 207.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE§
Cobb Coin I, 525 F.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 210.

FLA.
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of state and local concern." 216 It characterized the Florida interest
as one concerned with "obtaining and preserving cultural and
historical artifacts." 211 The court concluded that those instances could
be adequately protected by federal admiralty courts, while at the
same time insuring that "the paramount federal rights of salvors"
are protected. 218
The court also rejected Florida's argument that its statute was
an exercise of state police-powers and that it had minimal impact
on federal maritime concerns. 219 The court found that the impact
on federal maritime law was substantial because it directly affected
the salvage rights of vessels lost at sea. 220 Under the Supremacy
Clause, when the state laws conflict with the federal maritime law,
the state rules must give way. 221
Notwithstanding the arguments over federal maritime law,
Florida also argued that the Submerged Lands Act ceded to the
states the right to regulate maritime activities within the threemile limit. 222 In passing the Submerged Lands Act, Congress sought
to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
California, 223 which held that the United States had paramount
rights to all submerged lands extending three miles out from the
low water mark on the California shore. 224 The court in Cobb Coin
construed this decision as applying only to the disposition of the
natural resources of the submerged lands within the three-mile limit,
and not as a pronouncement which would overturn federal maritime
jurisdiction. 225 The basis for this conclusion is found in an analogy
to the Court's analysis in Treasure Salvors I that gave a limited
interpretation to OCSLA.226 In that case the Fifth Circuit concluded
that OCSLA allowed the United States to exercise the right to
regulate only the natural resources on the outer continental shelf. 221
The Cobb Coin court reasoned that since the Submerged Lands Act
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741 (1961)).
Cobb Coin I, 525 F . Supp. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 214.
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
Id. at 38.
Cobb Coin I, 525 F . Supp. at 215.
Treasure S alvors I , 569 F .2d at 339.
Id. at 338-40. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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was a companion piece of legislation to OCSLA, its application
should also be limited to the extraction of natural resources. 228 Since
cultural artifacts are not a part of the seabed's natural resources,
the Submerged Lands Act did not operate to delegate admiralty
and maritime matters to the states. 229
While the court rejected Florida's claim of ownership to the
wreck, it did attempt to address the State's interest in historic
preservation. Indeed, the court seemed particularly concerned that
salvors address the issue of the historical and archaeological
significance of their finds. The court indicated, in responding to
Florida's argument, that the State intended to use the artifacts
recovered for the cultural benefit of its citizens, 230 that the State's
concern was valid, and that the court "would certainly fashion relief
which would fully recognize the State's historic and cultural interests without interfering with the plaintiff's federal maritime
rights." 231
On Cobb Coin's motion for a preliminary injunction, it appeared
that the court might award a portion of Cobb Coin's finds to the
state, because of repeated references to such an award throughout
the opinion. 232 In its final judgment, however, the court declined to
make any salvage award to the State, although it did indicate that
the State of Florida could intervene when annual salvage awards
would be made as the salvage of the wreck continued. 233 The court
noted that the State already possessed, and had placed upon public
display, numerous artifacts from the 1715 fleet as a result of salvage
contracts with other salvors prior to the Cobb Coin and Treasure
Salvors decisions. 234
Perhaps of greater interest to state officials is the court's decision of the salvage methods required in the recovery of historic
shipwrecks. Specifically, the court noted that "salvaging methods
which fail to safeguard items and the invaluable archaeological information associated with the artifacts salvaged" would not be sanctioned by federal admiralty procedures. 235 Presumably, this means

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 210, 216 & 218.
Cobb Coin II, 549 F. Supp. at 561-62.
Id. at 562.
Cobb Coin I, 525 F. Supp. at 208.
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that a salvor must use acceptable salvage techniques designed to
collect as much archaeological information as possible. The salvor
is also expected to use acceptable preservation techniques in handling recovered artifacts to insure that they do not deteriorate after
they are removed from the seabed. 236 This decision is important,
for the court expressly rejects the holding of a Texas case in which
a district court declined to hold salvors to the standard of expertise required of marine archaeologists. 237 The Cobb Coin court held
"that in order to state a claim for a salvage award on an ancient
vessel of historical and archaeological significance, it is an essential element that the salvor document to the Admiralty Court's
satisfaction that it has preserved the archaeological provenance of
a shipwreck. 238
It appears that Florida may realize some of its objectives
through its intervention in the Cobb Coin admiralty action. The
State should be able to intervene in all actions of this type for the
purpose of insuring that appropriate recovery techniques are
utilized, and to claim a portion of the recovered artifacts to satisfy
the State's historical and cultural interests. Exactly how the court
intends to decide which artifacts are of such historical importance
that they should go to the State is not discussed in either of the
court's opinions of this case.
After Cobb Coin, when a state's underwater antiquities legislation conflicts with federal admiralty and maritime law, the state
law will be, in all likelihood, held invalid. Because most antiquities
laws (of those states that have them) are patterned after the Florida
Archives and History Act in that they assert ownership by the state
of all underwater cultural resources and utilize a permit system
coupled with a fixed system of recovery, 239 it seems likely that they
too will be held invalid.
A caveat to this analysis is the Maritime Surveys case discussed
earlier. 240 Relying on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in
Treasure Salvors Il, 241 the Maritime Surveys Court held that if a
236. Id. at 216.
237. Platoro Limited, Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp. 816, 822
(W .D. Texas 1981).
238. Cobb Coin II, 549 F. Supp. at 559.
239. Note, Cultural Resource Preservation and Underwater Archaeology: Some Notes on
the Current Legal Framework and a Model Underwater Antiquities Statute, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 623, 654-55 (1978).
240. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
241. 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
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state can show a colorable claim of title to a historic shipwreck
through the operation of the Submerged Lands Act, and a state
statute which claims ownership of historic shipwrecks, it may succeed in defeating the federal admiralty court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a private salvor's claim. 241
The Maritime Surveys opinion, however, may be limited in application since the appellate court found that plaintiffs went out
of their way in an attempt to join the state in its in rem admiralty
action. 243 It is at least arguable that the outcome might have been
different had Maritime framed its complaint differently, or had it
waited until state officials had taken some action to enjoin their
ongoing salvage operations. The Maritime Surveys court
distinguished the Cobb Coin decision by noting that the State of
Florida had, in effect, consented to the federal admiralty court's
jurisdiction in that action and thus waived its Eleventh Amendment
rights. 244 The Maritime Surveys opinion, however, ignores the Cobb
Coin analysis that found that, regardless of the State of Florida's
waiver, Cobb Coin's in rem admiralty action, which is for all practical purposes identical to the action brought by Maritime Surveys,
was not a suit against the State. 245 Rather, the Cobb Coin court concluded that plaintiff's action was a suit against property which lay
untouched and, from a legal standpoint, undiscovered before the
plaintiff began his suit. 246
The Cobb Coin court suggested that the wreck in question was
not in the possession of the State or any of its officers. 247 The court
also noted that the plaintiff asked for a salvage award. 248 According
to the court, no determination of the State's ownership is necessary
to provide for a salvage award. It thus appears that the Maritime
Surveys case fails to resolve all of the jurisdictional problems raised
by the salvors in rem admiralty actions for ownership and salvage
awards of historic shipwrecks. Taken together, both these cases,
Cobb Coin and Maritime Surveys, have served only to confuse the
situation with regard to the rights of private salvors to search and

242. Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1983).
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Cobb Coin II, 549 F. Supp. at 551.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 551.
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recover historic shipwreck resources, and the rights of states to
regulate such activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In concluding this discussion of the status of the regulation of
historic shipwreck resources, it is readily apparent that it is in a
state of disarray. At present, no clear operating framework exists
for the government or the salvor. As a result of the Treasure Salvors
line of cases, there is currently no federal or state regulation in
the area beyond the so-called three-mile limit. The only exceptions
are major federal actions (such as offshore oil drilling and mineral
extraction) which require an environmental impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act, 249 and several very limited
areas designated as marine sanctuaries under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.250
As far as regulation within state territorial waters is concerned
(the so-called three-mile limit), Cobb Coin raises serious questions
as to the validity of those regulatory programs which conflict with
basic principals of federal maritime law. As noted earlier, this probably would include most of the programs of the twenty-five states
which currently have legislation regulating such activity. Adding
to the confusion over state regulation is the Maritime Surveys decision which calls into question the jurisdiction of federal admiralty
courts over private salvage claims when state governments assert
an Eleventh Amendment defense in actions brought in rem, by
salvors, to validate their finds. The practical effect on Maritime
Surveys will not be to discourage salvors from conducting recovery
249. 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1976).
250. 33 U.S.C. § 1432 (1976). Another exception is historic shipwrecks which are found
in lands owned by the United States in fee simple. See Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 568 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1983). In Klein, the court rejected
a claim by a sport diver for ownership and, alternatively, for a salvage award for a historic
shipwreck discovered on submerged lands within the Key Biscayne National Monument.
The area encompassing the Key Biscayne National Monument is owned by the United States
in fee simple. Id. at 1565.
The court found that since the wreck was located on lands owned and controlled by
the United States it was in the constructive possession of the United States and thus was
not legally lost. Id. at 1565-67. Accordingly, the common law of finds did not apply. The
court also rejected the plaintiffs salvage claim by noting that since the United States was
in possession of the wreck it was entitled to refuse unwelcomed salvage offers. Id. at 1568.
The court further found that because Klein did not use acceptable salvage methods (i.e.,
methods designed to protect the archaeological provenance of artifacts he recovered), he
was not entitled to a salvage award. Id.
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operations on historic shipwrecks; rather it will simply shift the
legal battles which occur over the discovery of these wrecks from
the federal courts to the state courts.
It thus appears that the only reasonable way to avoid the continuing uncertainty in this area is through federal legislation. While
a detailed discussion of the legal issues raised .by the possible
legislative alternatives is beyond the scope of this article, at a
minimum federal legislation should address three major questions.
The first concern is what type of shipwrecks deserve protection.
Legislation may deal with all abandoned shipwrecks, or shipwrecks
which meet some state, or federal, statutory or regulatory criteria.
Once a decision is made regarding the kinds of resources to be protected, the next major question concerns which level of government
is best suited to administer such a program-the states or the
federal government, or perhaps a combination of both.
On the federal level, two possibilities exist. The first provides
for the creation of a federal regulatory program with no state involvement. The second approach would be to modify federal
admiralty law to authorize the protection of an appropriate class
of abandoned historic shipwrecks. The legislation could modify the
states' right to intervene in in rem proceedings in federal admiralty
court based on historic qualities of the shipwreck or state interest
in the shipwreck, and to assert a superior claim of ownership to
a qualifying wreck, or, as an alternative, assert a right to regulate
the activities affecting the wreck for the purposes of preserving
and protecting it.
Alternatively, state authority may be extended to ownership
of the resource or may be limited to management of the resource.
In this regard, state ownership or management of shipwrecks may
be conditioned on federal agency approval of state plans or state
legislation that meets minimum federal standards. Alternatively,
Congress could pass legislation providing for restricted or
unrestricted state ownership of the resources without federal
agency involvement.
Finally, any federal legislation should address the geographical
scope of any protection program; that is, whether it should extend
only to resources found within the territorial sea of the United
States (three miles), or beyond to include the limits of the Outer
Continental Shelf (two hundred miles).
These questions do not address all the possible options, but
do catalog most of the recently proposed legislative alternatives.
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In summary, the approaches are: (1) modification of admiralty law;
(2) an unconditioned declaration of state ownership of historic shipwrecks by Congress; (3) a conditioned declaration or transfer of the
ownership of historic shipwrecks by the Congress to the states; (4)
federal regulation of activities affecting historic shipwrecks beyond
the territorial sea. Careful consideration of these questions should
provide a basic framework through which much of the legal uncertainty over the regulation of historic shipwrecks can be resolved.
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